link to the original copy in ASIA TIMES


It's about annexation, stupid!
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi

Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) and co-author of "Negotiating Iran's Nuclear Populism", Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume XII, Issue 2, Summer 2005, with Mustafa Kibaroglu. He also wrote "Keeping Iran's nuclear potential latent", Harvard International Review. He is author of Iran's Nuclear Program: Debating Facts

 

FORWARD BY JANINE ROBERTS. - ISRAEL'S AIMS - ANNEXATION OF YET MORE LAND?

This article, appearing today, Aug 4th, 2006, in ASIA TIMES, and written by a Middle Eastern expert, bears a major warning. Is Israel concealing its long considered war aims? What do its deeds suggest? We now know this attack on Lebanon has been planned for a year.

The author suggests that water-short Israel is in fact after the water of the Lintani River some 50km beyond its frontier - not just after a new "buffer zone". He believes Israel is intending to eventually annex the Lebanese territory it has announced it wants as a buffer zone. This is not so far fetched an idea. Israel has constantly grown in size by invasion of its neighbours and by military victory - why should it be doing any different now? Israel has consistently refused to obey the UN Resolutions ordering it to leave the large amount of neighbouring Syrian territory, the Golan Heights, it seized and illegally occupies. Instead it has presumed to illegally annex these Heights, both because of their military importance and because they are an important water source.

He points out that the Zionist movement before the foundation of Israel said that the waters of the Litani River would be vital to the State it intended to found.

But I am not convinced that Israel will succeed with this war aim - if indeed it was its purpose. Even if it were, it looks as if the Israeli government might now be backing down - in the face of the very fierce opposition from Hizballah, the robust position of the Lebanese government and international outrage.

But - if annexation were, or still is, Israel's war aim?

It would explain why Israel's initial reaction seemed "over the top" - with its generals talking about destroying the social structure of Lebanon, "setting Lebanon back 20 years" - all because two soldiers had been captured close to a border that Israel itself constantly had violated with overflights.

It would explain why Bush and Condi Rice spoke of this seemingly marginal fight over two prisoners as the first step in "reshaping" the Middle East." Having revenge on Hizbullah and then withdrawing cannot be said to be 'reshaping the Middle East'.

If Israeli forces reach the Lintani River, then we might be able to see what are its aims. If it wants the water, it would need also to control its northern bank and the valley sides beyond. Today an Israeli general spoke of going further. Hizbullah yesterday predicted that Israel would be trying to invade futher north. Does Hezbullah also think this is Israel's war aim?

But if this is truely Israel's war aims - then it seems to have been fighting most ineptly. Surely they would have started with a massive ground invasion - a blitzkrieg attack to grab territory in depth, rather than arrive at it after more than two weeks of fighting? I therefore still am not convinced this author is right. It could however be that Israel's armed forces are now indeed inept.

It could of course be that they are now being forced to reconsider their plans - lowering their expectations.

But I am sure that some in Israeli's government or armed forces would love it if annexation were to become the outcome.

In practice - this may still be the war wish - Israel's government yesterday said that it would not hand over any territory it succeeds in occupying unless to an international force. There are major problems with this - Israel will be fully aware that no international force is likely to arrive until after a ceasefire is in place - and Hezbullah says will not stop fighting while Israel is still occupying Lebanese land. Israel thus anticipates no international force arriving until it has finished a fight to the death with Hezbulah - if the international communtiy allows it.

With the US pouring military supplies into Israel, this may yet be a long war. I just hope it isn't.

end -------------------------------------------------

a shortened version of the Asia Times article follows....

"Officially, Israel's ground invasion of Lebanon is an act of self-defense against Hezbollah's threat, aimed at creating a security buffer zone until the arrival of a "multinational force with an enforcement capability". But increasingly, as the initial goal of a narrow strip of only a few kilometers has now been extended up to the Litani River deep in Lebanon, the real motives behind Israel's invasion are becoming crystal-clear.

It's about (de facto) annexation, stupid. This is a war to annex a major chunk of Lebanese territory without necessarily saying so, under the pretext of security buffer and deterrence against future attacks on Israel. Already, since the Six Day War, Israel has annexed the Sheba Farms, considered part of the Syrian Golan Heights, although the government of Lebanon has long complained that the 25-square-kilometer area was a part of Lebanon.

"We have no intention of extending our operation more than 70 kilometers north of our borders with Lebanon," stated Lieutenant-Colonel Hemi Lini on the Lebanese border on July 17, one week after the war's outbreak.

This would put Israel, assuming for a moment that the Israel Defense Forces' operations prove ultimately successful, in control of the Litani River, thus fulfilling Israel's founding fathers' dream, stretching back to Chaim Weizmann, head of the World Zionist Organization, who in 1919 declared the river "essential to the future of the Jewish national home".

Consequently, contrary to the pro-Israel pundits' reassurances that this war is not about occupation, all the tangible signs indicate the exact opposite, ie, the distinct possibility of a "war of acreage" whereby Israel would expand its territory, acquire a new strategic depth, and simultaneously address its chronic water shortage by exploiting the Litani.

Access to the Litani would translate into an annual increase of water supply by 800 million cubic meters. This in turn might allow Israel to bargain with Syria over the Golan Heights, source of a full one-third of Israel's fresh water. However, a more likely scenario is Israel's continued unwillingness to abide by United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338 calling for its withdrawal from the Syrian territories.

The entire Western media have settled on a naive perspective of the reasons for Israel's invasion of Lebanon, namely as a defensive measure against Hezbollah. Conspicuously absent is any serious consideration of a viable, alternative explanation while focusing on, in essence, the same ingredients as in the 1982 invasion: "deceit and misleading statements" by leaders, "inaccurate announcements" by the military spokesmen, and "gross exaggeration" of threats, to paraphrase a candid reflection of an Israeli general, Yehoshafat Harkabi.

Following this scenario, Israel has dropped leaflets throughout southern Lebanon warning the civilians to leave or risk their lives, as they would be considered "Hezbollah sympathizers" if they refused to leave. Reminiscent of Israel's annexation of Palestinian lands in 1948 and beyond, the present war is causing mass refugees, who in all likelihood will not return to their homes any time soon.

The geostrategic and water dimensions of Israel's quest to possess southern Lebanon notwithstanding, the question is, of course, whether or not the world community will tolerate such a development that would remake the map of the Middle East.There are plenty of reasons to think that in light of the United States' complicit silence on Israel's violation of the territorial integrity of Lebanon, Israel will somehow manage to ride out the international criticisms and stick to its undeclared plan to annex southern Lebanon.

However, what is less certain is that the combined efforts of Hezbollah and the rest of Lebanese society, not to mention other Arab contributions, will prevail over Israel's appetite for a decent part of Lebanon.

With the military balance disproportionately in Israel's favor, we can safely assume that the new Operation Litani will succeed and thus create a "new Middle East" with a "greater" and geographically expanded Israel and a shrunken or diminished Lebanon.

If so, then the chronology of events narrated by future historians will closely follow this line of thought: that Israel deliberately provoked Hezbollah into action, after a six-year hiatus, by pressuring Hezbollah's ally, Hamas, which was subjected to a campaign of terror, financial squeeze and intimidation.

The laying of such a trap by Israel would not have happened in a vacuum of strategic thinking on Israel's part. The fact that Hezbollah fell into the trap is a result of several factors, including an adventurist element lending itself to the "reckless" action of Hezbollah on July 11 with respect to crossing the Blue Line and attacking an Israeli patrol.

Since then, the Israelis have put on the mask of being reluctant warriors, delaying their troops' entry into south Lebanon and thus perpetuating Israel's self-image as disinterested in any imperial grand objectives. Yet the facts on the ground speak louder than words and, indeed, what fact is more important than Israeli leaders' announced intention to occupy up to the Litani River?

Instead of searching for answers in the Israeli collective psyche or in the context of action, we must probe the answer in the writings of Israel's founding fathers, including Theodor Herzl and David Ben-Gurion, commonly yearning for Israel's control of the Litani River. As a timely addition to their old wish, Israel today has a security-related explanation, justifying the territorial takeover in the near future in terms of the lessons of the present war, the main lesson being Israel's dire need to gain strategic depth to avoid rocket attacks.

Indeed, the verdict will soon be out in Israel about the precious lesson of Lebanon War II, that is, how to prevent future rocket attacks in the only feasible way, that is, direct control of southern Lebanon.